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ABSTRACT 
Bioterrorism is a term that every person has had to come to grips 
with since the events of September 11, 2001. Industry has also had to 
take a hard look at how to be prepared for this new threat. The 
occupational and environmental health nurse (OEHN) has a unique 
opportunity to bridge the gap between the concerns of industry ~nd the 
community. The OEHN must have an in-depth knowledge of the top five 
biological agents that may be used in a terrorist attack and an explicit 
understanding of the occupational and environmental health nurse's roles 
and responsibilities. Beginning in January 2003, an assessment tool was 
developed to assess a large semiconductor company's occupational 
health department's preparedness in three major geographical regions. 
This tool, using the System's Theory (Rogers, 1994), thoroughly assessed 
the factors influencing the occupational health department. The results 
are the first step in understanding where improvements are needed so 
industry can be better prepared in the event of a bioterrorist attack. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of terrorism is to intimidate a population. Unfortunately, 
there are groups of people around the world that feel that terrorism is an 
appropriate tool to get their "messages" heard, and industry must be 
prepared for this eventuality .. Since September 11, 2001 and the 
subsequent anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, all federal, state, and local 
governments have enhanced their emergency preparedness plans. 
During the same time many industries have examined their emergency 
plans and developed terrorist threat preparedness. Bioterrorism threat 
preparedness is a subset of these plans because it has a very unique 
feature: bioterrorism can be unleashed without anyone's knowledge. This 
is different from a plane being flown into a building or a release of 
chemical agents because when these events happen they are recognized 
immediately as a public health disaster. Many of the biological threats 
have incubation periods of two to six days so a release can occur and not 
be recognized until a sufficient number of cases have developed. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have 
categorized the biological threats into three categories (2003a). 
Category A: The United States (U,S.) public health system and 
primary healthcare providers must be prepared to address various 
biological agents, including pathogens that are rarely seen in the 
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U.S. High-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to 
national security because they 
• can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to 
person; 
• result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major 
public health impact; 
• might cause public panic and social disruption; and 
• require special action for public health preparedness. 
Examples: Anthrax, Botulism and Tularemia 
Category B: Second highest priority agents include those that 
• are moderately easy to disseminate; 
• result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates; and 
• require specific enhancements of CDC's diagnostic capacity and 
enhanced disease surveillance. 
Examples: Brucellosis, Glanders, and Ricin Toxin 
Category C: Third highest priority agents include emerging 
pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the 
future because of 
• availability; 
• ease of production and dissemination; 
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• and potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major 
health impact 
Examples: Nipah Virus and Hantavirus. 
Using these prioritized categories of bacterial agents, the 
occupational and environmental health nurse (OEHN) must increase 
his/her knowledge of these known potentially dangerous agents of 
terrorism. 
The role of the OEHN is varied and complex. Many factors 
influence response to a threat such as bioterrorism. The fundamental 
roles of planner, educator, and emergency responder must be explored to 
create an effective preparedness plan for the occupational health 
department. 
Many corporations have extremely robust and comprehensive 
emergency preparedness plans. The occupational health department of a 
large semiconductor company began exploring biological threat 
preparedness as part of the corporation's business plan in the summer/fall 
of 2002. A preparedness evaluation was conducted in the spring of 2003. 
An administrative tool was developed so that it could be used by each of 
the 25 occupational health clinics within this corporation. The goal was to 
provide the clinics with an understanding of their individual clinic biological 
threat preparedness. 
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CHAPTER2 
BIOLOGICAL THREAT PROFILES 
Each bacterial biological agent has a unique disease profile. These 
profiles must be understood to ensure preparedness for a biological event. 
The top five bacterial agents are Smallpox, Anthrax, Tularemia, Plague, 
and Botulism. Each agent will be reviewed including its history, 
transmission/communicability, signs and symptoms, infection and 
exposure control, prevention or prophylaxis, and treatment. 
Smallpox 
History 
Smallpox is an infectious disease caused by the variola virus. The 
term smallpox comes from the Latin word for "spotted" because the 
lesions cover the patient's face and body. Although the first classification 
of the disease, later to be called smallpox, appeared in a fourth century 
Chinese text, it was not until the 151h century that Europeans, in an effort 
to distinguish variola from the great pox (syphilis), began using the term 
smallpox. For both cultures, this disease spread quickly and wiped out 
thousands during the years before it was contained. By the eighth 
century, China and India had attempted vaccinations for smallpox, but it 
was not until 1796 that the first modern attempt to vaccinate against 
smallpox was performed by Edward Jenner. He proved that smallpox 
could be prevented by inoculation of a person with material from a cowpox 
lesion (CDC, 2002c). This breakthrough turned the tide of the epidemic 
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and in 1980, following a 24 year intensive global eradication program, 
smallpox was declared "globally eradicated" by the World Health 
Organization (WHO). Through the use of vaccination, detection, and 
isolation, the last United States case of smallpox was reported in Texas in 
1949 and the last natural smallpox case was in Somalia in October of 
1977. 
Currently the only known sources of the variola virus can be found 
either at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, 
or at the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology in 
Koltsovo, Russia (CDC, 2002c). It is feared, however, that other countries 
or terrorists groups have obtained a supply of the variola virus. Smallpox 
is a bioterrorism threat for two reasons: 1) it has the potential to cause 
severe morbidity in a non-immune population, and 2) it can be spread via 
an airborne route (English, 1999). 
The variola virus is a member of the genus Orthopoxvirus, family 
Poxviradae (CDC, 2002c). There are two clinical forms of smallpox: 
variola minor and variola major. Variola minor is a less severe disease 
with a fatality rate of <1 %. Variola major is divided into four clinical 
presentations based on the Rao classification of 1972. The four different 
types are identified by skin lesions: ordinary, modified, flat/malignant, and 
hemorrhagic. Ordinary is the most common, occurring in 90% of all 
cases. Modified, also common, is usually seen in previously vaccinated 
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patients. The two rarest and severest types of smallpox Flat/Malignant 
and Hemorrhagic are usually fatal (CDC, 2002c). 
Mode of Transmission/Communicability 
Smallpox's mode of transmission is by both large and small 
respiratory droplets, either aerosolized artificially or from a human host. 
~-
There are no known natural hosts of the virus. The droplets can originate 
from oral, nasal, or pharyngeal mucosa of a person who is in the 
communicable stages of smallpox. Although very rare, the chance of skin 
lesion transmission of smallpox is possible. Face-to-face contact, either 
within a household or at a health care facility, can result in disease 
transmission. "Household secondary attack rates are generally 50% to 
60%" (CDC, 2002c, p. 235), meaning that those within the same 
household get infected approximately 50% to 60% of the time by just 
being in the proximity of a smallpox patient. 
The incubation period for smallpox is from 7 to 17 days but is 
usually about 12 to 14 days. During this time the patients, while not 
contagious, may not have symptoms and may actually feel well. 
The patients become infectious when the lesions start to develop in 
the mouth and pharynx. They remain contagious throughout the course of 
the illness, until the last lesion has separated and fallen from the skin. 
Because it is sometimes difficult to observe the rash inside the mouth and 
on the pharynx, disease transmission can occur before overt signs of 
smallpox develop. These eruptions can begin to occur late in the initial or 
Bioterrorism 7 
prodromal stage of smallpox. It must be assumed that smaltpox patients 
are contagious within 24 to 48 hours of symptom onset. L 
Signs & Symptoms 
All four types of variola major have the same initial symptoms which 
include: acute onset of fever 2: 101°F, malaise, headache, muscle pain, ! 
nausea, vomiting, and backache. These non-specific symptoms can be l'--
confused with any number of other conditions. The patients are usually 
quite ill and are not able to perform normal activities. This initial phase 
usually lasts between two to four days but communicability is unclear 
unless lesions begin developing in the oral or pharyngeal membranes. 
During this initial phase, the four different types of smallpox diverge. 
Ordinary 
The macules, small localized changes in the colore of the skin that is 
neither raised nor depressed, occur two to four days after the onset of 
fever. The first spots known as "herald spots" usually occur on the face. 
Within 24 hours all parts of the body become covered from the proximal 
extremities working outward to the distal extremities. The rash is 
pervasive and can even cover the palms of the hands and soles of the 
feet. It develops all at once, with each area of the body being at the same 
phase at the same time. The rash also is more densely populated distally, 
having more lesions on the extremities than on the trunk. These two 
unique characteristics help separate this rash from that of the common 
Varicella or Chickenpox. 
Bioterrorism 
By day three of the rash, the macules convert to papules which are 
solid rounded bumps. By day five, the papules change into vesicles which 
are small blisters that become "opaque and turbid" (CDC, 2002c) within 48 
hours. At this stage "umbilication" occurs. The middle of the vesicle (and 
eventually the pustule) becomes depressed giving the lesion the 
appearance of having an umbilicus. This umbilication is uncommon in 
other vesicular or pustular rashes. By day seven of the rash, all of the 
vesicles become pustules. These pustules are typically raised and very 
firm to the touch. They are described as being "shotty" as if upon 
palpation they are filled with small pellets or "gun shot" (CDC, 2002a). 
Around day 14 of the rash, all of the pustules should have a scab, with 
some even separating and falling from the skin. Confluent smallpox, a 
subcategory of the ordinary group, occurs when the pustular lesions are 
so extensive and numerous that they cover large portions of the face and 
extremities. The smaller lesions actually merge to become one large 
lesion. 
The presence of a fever and symptom severity depends on the 
clinical eruption of the rash. The more lesions are present, the more 
grave the prognosis. The overall fatality rate of ordinary smallpox is 30% 
with the ordinary confluent type of smallpox having a fatality rate of 62% 
(CDC, 2002c). 
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Modified 
Modified smallpox occurs most often in those patients who have 
been previously vaccinated. The prodromal phase is less severe' but has 
all the same signs and symptoms of ordinary smallpox. The lesions tend 
to develop quicker, with less uniformity and are fewer in number. This l 
variola form usually progresses quickly and is rarely fatal. 
Flat/Malignant 
' L 
The prodromal phase is more severe, but again has the same 
symptoms as both the ordinary and modified. It lasts up to four days with 
the oral rash becoming extensive. By the seventh day of the rash, the 
lesions flatten out and are filled with less fluid than the ordinary type of 
smallpox. The umbilication of the vesicles is absent and the lesions feel 
velvety, soft to the touch, and may contain blood. Most cases of flat 
smallpox are fatal (CDC, 2002c). 
Hemorrhagic 
Hemorrhagic signs can occur either early or late in the course of 
the disease. The prodomal phase can be prolonged with additional 
symptoms of dusky flesh and sepsis. Bleeding from the mouth and gums, 
subconjunctiva, epistaxis, and hematuria can occur at any time. By the 
seventh day death usually occurs. If patients survive to the tenth day, the 
rash remains as flat vesicles and never progresses to the pustule phase. 
Little is known about further rash progression because most patients die 
Bioterrorism 
within ten days. 
Infection and Exposure Control 
Any suspected case of smallpox is considered a public health 
emergency and must be reported to the health department in the local 
area. Patient isolation, both respiratory and contact, is critical to prevent 
secondary transmission. All persons having contact with patients must 
use proper personal protective equipment such as properly fitted 
respirators of N95 or higher, disposable gloves, gowns, eye protection, 
and shoe covers. Reusable bedding and clothing can be autoclaved and 
reused but all other material must be disposed of as hazardous biological 
waste. 
Within an institutional setting it is important that rooms inhabited by 
smallpox patients not share the same ventilation system as the rest of the 
hospital. Droplets are easily airborne and can travel through the 
ventilation system. 
Prevention or Prophylaxis 
Global vaccination against smallpox officially stopped after WHO 
declared the disease eradicated in 1980. Before September 11, 2001, 
vaccinations were only recommended for laboratory workers who came in 
contact with variola and military personnel. As of January 11, 2003, the 
Office for Homeland Security released its vaccination recommendation to 
include "Public health, hospital, and other personnel, generally 18-65 
10 
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years of age, who may respond to a smallpox case or outbreak" 
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2003, p. 1 ). 
The smallpox vaccine is created from the live virus vaccinia which 
is similar to variola but less severe. The vaccination lasts anywhere from 
three to five years for the first immunization with longer protection for I 
subsequent vaccinations (CDC, 2002b). ~-! 
Smallpox vaccine is administered differently than the typical 
vaccine that most people have received. The smallpox vaccine is given in t-
the upper arm using a two-pronged needle that is dipped into the vaccine 
solution and then repeatedly (from 3 to15 times depending on previous 
vaccination history) pricked into the skin. A drop/trace of blood should 
appear at the vaccination site. A scab will form at the vaccination site and 
until that scab falls off the vaccinia virus can be spread to other parts of 
the body or other people. The vaccination site must be covered using 
both a gauze bandage and semi-permeable dressing that is changed at 
least every three to five days (Department of Health and Human Services, 
2003). 
During the first three to four days, the vaccination site should 
develop a red itchy macule. Within seven days the macule will begin to 
blister, fill with pus, and begin to drain. Within the second week the blister 
will dry up and form a scab, which sloughs off within the third week leaving 
a telltale scar. Figure 2.1 shows the progression of the vaccination site. 
Figure 2.1 
Smallpox Vaccination Site 
Days 4 through 21 
Source: CDC (2003d) 
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There is a vast wealth of knowledge about who should not get the 
smallpox vaccination and the side effects and complications associated 
with smallpox vaccination due to the large volume of persons vaccinated 
in the early 201h century. 
Given an actual biological attack, the risk of the smallpox 
vaccination must be weighed against the likelihood for developing the 
disease after a known exposure. According to the CDC (2003d), 
Individuals who have any of the following conditions, or live with 
someone who does, should not get the smallpox vaccine unless they 
have been exposed to the smallpox virus: 
• Eczema or atopic dermatitis. (This is true even if the condition is 
not currently active, mild, or experienced as a child.) 
• Skin conditions such as burns, chickenpox, shingles, impetigo, 
herpes, sever acne, or psoriasis. (People with any of these 
Bioterrorism 
conditions should not get the vaccine until they have completely 
healed.) 
• Weakened immune system. (Cancer treatment, an organ 
transplant, HIV, some severe autoimmune disorders and 
medications to treat autoimmune disorders, and other illnesses 
can weaken the immune system.) 
• Pregnancy or plan to become pregnant within one month of 
vaccination. 
In addition, individuals should not get the smallpox vaccine if they: 
• Have allergies to the vaccine or any of its ingredients. 
• Are younger than 12 months of age. 
• Have a moderate or severe short term illness. (These people 
should wait until they are completely recovered to get the 
vaccine.) 
• Are currently breastfeeding. 
• Use steroid drops in their eyes. (They should wait until they are 
no longer using the medication to get the vaccine.) 
Reactions after the smallpox vaccination can be divided into three 
categories: normal, moderate, and life-threatening. Table 2.1 outlines the 
various reactions and their prevalence. 
13 
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Normal, 
Typical, Mild 
Reaction-
self-limiting 
with no need 
for medical 
intervention 
Serious, 
Severe 
Reaction-
needs 
immediate 
medical 
attention 
Life-
Threatening 
Reaction 
Bioterrorism 
TABLE2.1 
Reactions after Smallpox Vaccination 
General feeling illness 
would prevent someone from 
going to work or school or 
participating in recreational 
activities. Temporary 
difficulties 
vaccinia rash or outbreak 
of sores limited to another 
area other than the 
vaccination site. 
• Usually caused by 
accidental spreading of 
the vaccinia virus by 
touching the vaccination 
site and then touching 
another body part 
• Eye infection can lead to 
loss of vision 
A widespread vaccine 
that is spread through the 
blood 
Eczema 
rash that is caused by 
widespread infection of the 
skin in people with eczema 
or 
Progressive 
infection of the skin 
CDC (2003d) 
1,000 out of every 1 
million 
14 
,_ 
l 
' 
i 
~ 
' 
Bioterrorism 15 
Vaccinia immune globulin (VI G) is an investigational new drug that 
may be used in the treatment of the most severe cases of reactions l c-j 
associated with the administration of smallpox vaccine. The CDC is the 
only source of this treatment which should be reserved for the most 
severe adverse reactions. 
Treatment 
f 
r 
Post-Exposure Management 
Should a bioterrorist attack occur and smallpox released, the 
immunization of exposed individuals should occur within three days. While 
this may not totally prevent the disease it will substantially decrease j 
symptoms. 
Due to the events of September 11, 2001, the CDC has stockpiled I 
enough smallpox vaccine to respond to an outbreak or large-scale terrorist 
attack (CDC, 2002b). 
Management of Smallpox Patients 
There are no proven treatments for patients with clinical smallpox. 
Multiple antiviral drug studies have been done and failed to show 
significant benefit in the treatment of smallpox (CDC, 2002a). 
Supportive therapy can be used with all smallpox patients to 
prevent respiratory, secondary skin, and other infections. Some patients 
may require parental nutrition and assisted breathing through the use of 
mechanical ventilation. 
Bioterrorism 
Anthrax 
History 
Anthrax is an acute bacterial infectious disease caused by a spore 
forming, gram positive bacillus called Bacillus anthracis. The term 
"anthracis" is taken from the Greek word for "coal!! because of the color of 
the dark lesions that is associated with the disease. For centuries anthrax 
has been causing disease in animals such as sheep, goats, and cattle 
which acquired the disease from eating spore contaminated soil. Humans 
become infected from handling, ingesting, or inhaling the B. anthracis 
spores. One of the first occupational diseases associated with B. 
anthracis was "wool sorter's disease", a disease that afflicted workers who 
had been exposed to goat hair (English, 1999). The Bacillus spores can 
not been seen with the naked eye, and have no color, smell, or taste 
(CDC, n.d.). 
Anthrax is differentiated into three categories: inhalation, 
cutaneous, and gastrointestinal. Each is vastly different in the way the 
disease is acquired and progresses. As seen in the fall and winter of 
2001, bioterrorists used aerosolized anthrax to wreak havoc, cause fear, 
and kill five people in the United States. During that tragedy there were 
"twenty-two confirmed or suspected cases (11 confirmed inhalational; 7 
confirmed and 4 suspected cutaneous) in Florida, New York, New Jersey, 
the District of Columbia, and Connecticut" (Ashford, 2002, p. 223). Before 
these U.S. cases, there were only 18 cases of inhalational anthrax from 
16 
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1900-1978; 224 cases of cutaneous anthrax from 1944-1994; and no · 
gastrointestinal anthrax reported. During these same time periods there 
were episodic outbreaks of gastrointestinal anthrax in Africa, Asia, and 
Thailand due to eating improperly cooked meat. Very little is known or 
documented about occurrence of gastrointestinal anthrax. 
Mode of Transmission/Communicability 
lnhalational 
lnhalational anthrax refers to the way the spores are introduced into 
the human body. It is also the most lethal of all anthrax types resulting in 
a mortality rate of 89% (lngelsby, 1999). In fatal cases "the interval 
between onset of symptoms and death averaged 3 days" (lngelsby, 1999, 
p. 1737). The number of spores needed to cause infection is unknown but 
it is believed that anywhere between 2,500 to 55,000 spores would kill 
approximately 50% of the population who were exposed (lngelsby, 1999). 
Person-to-person transmission of inhalational anthrax does not occur. 
The incubation period for inhalational anthrax ranges from 1 to 60 days 
with the most common period of between one and seven days. 
Cutaneous 
Cutaneous anthrax is the most common (>95%) of all naturally 
occurring anthrax infections with an incubation period from one to twelve 
days. Transmission occurs from the deposition of spores onto the skin 
through cuts, abrasions, or other weakened areas. Toxins are then 
produced which form the tell-tale lesions. If antibiotics are administered, 
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cutaneous anthrax has a very low mortality rate. If antibiotics are not 
administered, the mortality rate can be as high as 20% (lngelsby, 1999). It 
is thought that transmission of cutaneous anthrax may occur from direct 
contact with the lesion secretions but this is very rare and still under 
investigation. 
Gastrointestinal 
The incubation period for gastrointestinal anthrax is from one to 
seven days after the ingestion of undercooked, contaminated meat. 
Gastrointestinal anthrax is difficult to detect. It is believed that most cases 
are fatal but if they were detected early and antibiotic therapy were 
initiated, mortality rates would be decreased. 
Signs & Symptoms 
lnhalational 
The first symptoms are non-specific and include "fever, dyspnea, 
cough, headache, vomiting, chills, weakness, abdominal pain, and chest 
pain" (lngelsby, 1999, p. 1736). These symptoms can be easily confused 
with other conditions such as the flu. There may or may not be a brief 
period of improvement or recovery but within two to four days, the 
fulminate stage of inhalational anthrax begins. This stage occurs 
suddenly and is heralded by a widened mediastinum on chest x-ray, 
sudden fever, respiratory failure, hemodynamic collapse, meningitis, 
delirium, and obtundation. While inhalation anthrax is treatable with 
18 
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antibiotics at the early stages, death occurs within a matter of hours at the 
later stages of disease. 
Cutaneous 
The first sign of cutaneous anthrax is often a pruritic papule that 
changes into a vesicle which is sometimes hemorrhagic. These vesicles 
contain a significant number of organisms at this stage. Within two to six 
days the vesicle develops into a painless, depressed eschar often 
accompanied by localized swelling and itching. Patients may also 
experience systemic symptoms such as fever and edema. If left 
untreated, toxemia may occur but this condition is rarely fatal if treated 
With antibiotics. 
Gastrointestinal 
The signs and symptoms of this form of anthrax are extremely non-
specific and include abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, fever, bloody 
diarrhea, and hematemesis (English, 1999). Gram-positive bacilli can be 
seen on blood cultures within two to three days but by then toxemia and 
sepsis have most likely already occurred, and resulted in death. 
Infection and Exposure Control 
According to lnglesby (1999), "There is no data to suggest patient-
to-patient transmission of anthrax occurs" (p. 1737) Standard infection 
control or universal precautions should be used with patients who have 
cutaneous anthrax to prevent the potential for secondary transmission but 
no additional measures are warranted. 
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Proper burial or cremation procedures for animals and humans who r t 
. 
have anthrax are necessary to prevent further transmission of the disease i r 
through the soil. 
Prevention or Prophylaxis 
A vaccine is available against anthrax. It is an inactivated cell-free 
product that must be administered in a series of three subcutaneous 
injections given two weeks apart, followed by boosters at six, twelve, and 
eighteen months. Annual boosters are also recommended. In 2003 the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Advisory Committee on 
Immunization (ACIP) recommended that the following groups should be 
vaccinated against anthrax 
1. persons who work directly with the organism in the laboratory; 
' 2. persons who work with imported animal hides or furs in areas 
where standards are insufficient to prevent exposure to anthrax 
spores; 
3. persons who handle potentially infected animal products in high-
incidence areas; while incidence is low in the United States, 
veterinarians who travel to work in other countries where incidence 
is higher should consider being vaccinated; and 
4. military personnel deployed to areas with high risk for exposure to 
the organism (CDC, 2003b, p. 1). l 
Adverse reactions to the anthrax vaccine are seen in greater than 
30% of all recipients but are usually limited to local redness and 
Bioterrorism 
tenderness at the injection site. Systemic reactions are very rare and 
occur in less than 0.2% of recipients. 
Treatment 
Post-Exposure Management 
In 1999 a working group of 21 medical, government, military, public 
heath, and emergency management professionals developed a 
consensus statement outlining what treatment protocols should be used in 
the event of a bioterrorist attack using inhalation anthrax. This treatment 
protocol was redefined after the events of 2001. The antibiotics . 
ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and penicillin G procaine are the only drugs 
approved by the FDA for the post-exposure treatment from inhalational 
anthrax. This prophylaxis is indicated should the person be in an airspace 
contaminated with aerosolized B. anthracis but final determination of the 
need for prophylaxis would be determined by the public health officials. 
The three different treatment options available are: 
1. 60 days of antibiotics; 
2. 100 days of antibiotics; or 
3. 100 days of antibiotics and the investigational use of the anthrax 
vaccine (Ashford, 2002). 
Management of Anthrax Patients 
A multi-drug approach to the treatment of inhalational anthrax 
infection is currently recommended by the CDC. This therapy includes 
ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and other agents to which the organism is 
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susceptible. This susceptibility can only be determined after the organism 
is cultured and put through a battery of antibiotic resistance tests. In 
cutaneous anthrax a similar multi-drug approach is taken with the addition 
of steroids to decrease the edema (cutaneous or meningial) that is 
associated with the disease. While there are no current recommendations 
for gastrointestinal anthrax, it is assumed that the multi-drug approach 
would be an appropriate treatment regime. 
Tularemia 
History 
Tularemia is an acute infectious disease caused by the Francisella 
tularensis gram negative coccobacillus. It was first described in 1911 and 
has been reported in every state except Hawaii. "During 1999-2000, a 
total of 1,368 cases of tularemia were reported to CDC from 44 states, 
averaging 124 cases (range: 86 to 193) per year'' (CDC, 2000, p. 182). 
The majority of cases occurred during the summer months and the highest 
numbers of cases were located in the middle of the country: Arkansas, 
Missouri, Okalahoma, Kansas, South Dakota, and Montana (CDC, 2000). 
F. tularensis has been investigated and studied since 1932 when 
Japanese germ warfare experts began exploring its use as a biological 
weapon. In the 1950's and 1960's the United States developed a delivery 
method that would properly aerosolize and disseminate it as a weapon. 
Bacteria were stockpiled by the U.S. military until an executive order in 
1970 demanded the destruction of all U.S. biological weapons (Dennis, 
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2001). In 1969 the World Health Organization estimated that an aerosol 
dispersal of "50 kg of virulent F tularensis over a metropolitan area with 5 
million inhabitants would result in 250,000 incapacitating casualties, 
including 19,000 deaths" (Dennis, 2001, p. 2764). 
Mode of Transmission/Communicability 
In naturally occurring tularemia, people are commonly infected 
from 
• biting arthropods (ticks and deerflies) that have fed on infected 
animals; 
• handling infected animal carcasses; 
• eating or drinking contaminated water or food; and 
• inhaling infected aerosols. 
Person-to-person transmission of the disease does not occur. 
Communicability is limited to the biological event. 
There are two strains of Francisella tularensis that are differentiated 
by their virulence. Type A infection, caused by Francisella tularensis 
biovar tularensis, is the more severe and deadly type and is broken down 
into many clinical forms: ulceroglandular, glandular, oculoglandular, 
oropharyngeal, pneumonic, typhoidal, and septic (Dennis, 2001). Each 
clinical form varies given the organism, dose, and site on inoculums. 
Overall the death rate of Type A tularemia is from 5-15% with both 
untreated pneumonic and the septic forms ranging from 30-60%. Type B 
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infections, caused by the Franciselfa tu/arensis biovar palaearctica, are 
rarely, if ever, fatal. 
The incubation period is typically three to five days but can go as 
high as 14 days. 
Signs & Symptoms 
Because of the numerous ways that tularensis can occur, Table 2.2 
details the differentiating signs and symptoms. 
Infection and Exposure Control 
Universal precautions should be used with patients who have 
tularemia even though infections can not be spread from person-to-
person. 
According to Altman (2002), exposure to F. tularensis can be 
prevented by following these simple precautions 
1. be knowledgeable about the potential risks in your area; 
2. avoid contaminated and untreated water; 
3. treat potentially contaminated water with iodine, appropriate filters, 
or boiling; 
4. avoid undercooked meat, especially wild game; 
5. use rubber gloves when skinning, cleaning, or cutting wild animals; 
6. avoid insect bites, especially blood suckers and treat if bitten; 
7. check body periodically for ticks and remove them by grasping with 
tweezers and pulling straight out; do not burn or twist; 
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Table 2.2 
Differentiating Signs and Symptoms of Tularemia 
Ulceroglandular: 
typically arises 
from handling 
contaminated 
carcasses and/or 
an arthropod bite 
Oculoglandular: 
follows direct 
contamination to 
the eye 
acquired from 
consuming 
contaminated 
water or food or 
inhaling 
contaminated 
can be result of 
inhalation or from 
secondary 
hematogenous 
spread from 
inoculums site 
• Papule appears at the inoculation site about the 
same time as the general symptoms begin 
• Papule changes to pustular and will ulcerate 
within a few days of its appearance 
• Ulcer is tender, indolent, and covered by eschar 
• Regional lymph nodes become enlarged and 
even and 
• Ulcers on the conjunctiva 
• Pronounced chemosis 
• Vasculitis 
• 
• Stomatitis 
• Exudative pharyngitis 
• Tonsillitis sometimes with ulceration 
• Pharyngitis 
• Bronchiolitis 
• Pleuropneumonitis 
• Hilar lymphadentitis 
Advancing to: 
• Peribronchial infiltrates advancing to 
bronchopneumonia 
• Pleural effusions 
• Hilar lympadenopathy 
OR 
• Symptoms may be minimal or absent and include 
• small pulmonary infiltrates 
• discrete pulmonary infiltrates 
• scattered granulomatous lesions of lung 
parenchyma or pleura 
With either condition advancing to: 
• severe pneumonia 
• respiratory failure 
• death 
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Table 2.2 
Differentiating Signs and Symptoms of Tularemia (cont.) 
No cutaneous lesion or regionallymphadentitis 
• Prominent gastrointestinal issues such as 
diarrhea and 
Septic: • Patient appears toxic 
begins by following • Confusion 
the same course • Coma 
as typhoidal • Systemic inflammatory response syndrome 
• Disseminated intravascular coagulation and 
bleeding 
• Acute respiratory distress syndrome 
• failure 
Dennis (2001) 
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8. wear protective, light colored clothing to make ticks more 
noticeable; 
9. wear long sleeves and tuck pants into boots; 
10. avoid walking in tall grass or brush; 
11. use insect repellent containing Pyrethrum in locations where ticks 
are common; 
12. shower after being outdoors; and 
13. check pets that have been outside for fleas and ticks. 
Prevention or Prophylaxis · 
Currently there is a vaccine used to protect laboratory workers but it 
is not recommended for the general public due to limited effectiveness and 
lack of clinical studies. Since tularemia progresses at such a rapid pace, 
the vaccine administered post-exposure would not be as effective 
because the disease would progress faster than the vaccine could provide 
protection. 
Treatment 
Untreated tularemia of any kind can progress to sepsis and cause 
death within three days. Management of tularemia patients is the same 
regardless of when exposed. Antibiotics administered intravenously (IV) 
are the first treatment choice if there are limited numbers of people 
exposed. Streptomycin is the primary antibiotic of choice with gentamicin, l 
doxycycline, chloramphernicol, and ciprofloxacin being acceptable 
alternatives. All antibiotics should be continued for 10 days. In the event 
Bioterrorism 
that an attack resulted in mass casualties, oral administration of 
streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline, chloramphernicol, and 
ciprofloxacin are acceptable and must be continued for 14 days. 
Should the disease progress, other medical support measures such 
as artificial ventilation, IV nutrition, and skin care should also be performed 
in an advanced care setting. 
Plague 
History 
Though the threat of overwhelming deaths associated with plague 
ended many years ago, the mere mention of plague still brings terror to 
people worldwide. The first pandemic episode of the plague occurred in 
541 AD "that began in Egypt and swept across Europe with attributable 
population losses of between 50%-60% in North Africa, Europe, and 
central and South Asia" (lngelsby, 2000, p. 2281). The second pandemic 
spanned over 130 years beginning in 1346. "The Black Death" took the 
lives of 24 million people between the years of 1346 and 1352 and 
claimed perhaps another 20 million by the end ofthe 141h century 
(McGovern, 2000). During this time physicians had no understanding of 
how the disease spread or how to treat it. In 1345 some French 
physicians postulated that the plague was caused by the conjunction of 
the planets Saturn, Mars, and Jupiter. Other physicians recommended a 
simple diet, exercise, and strong emotion. With ignorance matched only 
by lack of judgment, one church rector quarantined the entire population of 
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~is township, both the sick and the well. The death toll in that community 
was 100%. The third or modern pandemic plague episode began in China 
in 1894, and aided by advances in transportation, spread throughout the 
world (McGovern, 2000), Early in the modern pandemic the etiologic 
agent was discovered, the investigation on how it spread began, and 
treatment options were identified. At first the disease was thought to be 
the "disease of rats" since large numbers of rats usually died in the weeks 
before a human outbreak occurred. It was not until1898 that investigators 
began looking at fleas as the carrier between the rat and humans, and 
found the disease causing agent Yersinia pestis. The first case of plague 
in the United States occurred in 1900 when the lifeless body of a Chinese 
laborer was discovered in a hotel basement in San Francisco, California 
(McGovern, 2000). Although never eradicated, massive urban rat control, 
human hygiene measures, and significant advances in medicine have 
decreased both the occurrence and mortality rates of plague. According 
to the World Health Organization, global occurrences of plague are 
between 1, 000 to 3,000 cases per year with approximately 10 to 15 
plague cases happening in the United States (CDC, 2003c). 
Unfortunately the plague's history as a biological weapon is equally 
as terrifying. The first attempt to use the bacterium was in 1346 when 
Muslim Tatar leaders catapulted corpses of their plague ridden colleagues 
into the Christian Genoese camp in hopes that the Genoese soldiers 
would contract plague. It appeared to the Muslims that this strategy 
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worked as many Genoese soldiers succumbed to the plague and the 
Genoese army fled back to Italy. Rather than the corpses spreading the 
disease, the increased rat population in the Genoese camps caused the 
spread. During World War II, the Japanese army biological warfare 
division did extensive research and testing in the use of the plague as a 
weapon including alleged use against China. 
Plague remains on every continent except Australia. The plague is 
divided into three distinct types: Bubonic, septicemic, and pneumonic. 
According to lngelsby (2000), the type and fatality rate of plague are 
distributed as follows: 
Table 2.3 
Type and Fatality Rates of the Plague 
Se ticemic 
Pneumonic 
Source: lngelsby (2000) 
···PcetF~Il~ye C)lPases · 
.· itl,f..as(5Q. ears 
13% 
2% 
Mode of Transmission/Communicability 
· Fa,~lity~af~·.··· 
· Percenta e) 
22% 
57% 
Transmission of naturally occurring plague happens in these ways 
• fleas: bites, inoculation from flea feces, and direct human 
removal of fleas by biting them from each other (as occurs in 
some cultural grooming practices); 
• infected animals: draining abscesses, eating, handling pelts, 
and breathing aerosols; and 
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• other humans: aerosols or direct contact with infected body 
substances (McGovern, 2000). 
The incubation period for naturally occurring plague is from two to 
eight days after being bitten. It is feared that if an aerosolization plague 
were released, the incubation period would be between one to six days. 
Signs & Symptoms 
Naturally Occurring Plague-Bubonic 
Buboes, an inflamed swelling of the lymph nodes, begin after the 
incubation period and become visible usually in the groin within 24 hours. 
They are so intensely painful that even nearly comatose patients will 
"attempt to shield them from trauma and will abduct their extremities to 
decrease pressure" (McGovern, 2000, p. 14). Along with the buboes there 
is sudden fever, chills, and headache followed by nausea and vomiting. 
Other symptoms that may occur are altered mental status, abdominal 
pain, chest pain, bladder distention, apathy, confusion, fright, anxiety, 
oliguria, and anuria. In 5-15% of bubonic cases, patients will develop 
secondary pneumonic plague, thus making them at risk of infecting others 
with their lung secretions. 
Plague as a Biological Weapon-Pneumonic 
An intentional release of aerosoled Y. Pestis would differ 
substantially from the naturally occurring instances of the plague because 
it would result in large numbers of the pneumonic type. The symptoms 
would mimic many other severe respiratory infections such as fever, 
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cough, chest pain, hemoptysis, muco-purulent or watery sputum, and 
radiographic evidence of bronchopneumonia (English, 1999). The 
symptoms would begin within one to six days following the exposure with 
very high fatality rates. 
Infection and Exposure Control 
Naturally Occurring Plague-Bubonic 
Unless there is a pneumonic component associated with the plague 
person-to-person transmission is not usually seen. 
Plague as a Biological Weapon-Pneumonic 
Person-to-person transmission is possible via infectious particle 
droplets so droplet precautions must be in place for all pneumonic plague 
patients for at least 48 hours post initiation of antibiotic therapy (lngelsby, 
2000). Patients can be grouped together but must be isolated from non-
plague· patients. 
Prevention or Prophylaxis 
Since fleas are the carrier of the plague, the easiest prevention 
strategy is to eliminate all fleas and rats. While this may be an excellent 
idea it is impractical. Exposure control and education must be the main 
thrusts of the efforts to control plague cases. Environmental sanitation 
and rat control in areas where humans live, work, and play have been 
achieved in many areas and must remain a key focus. Education on 
staying away from disease-bearing animals, avoiding their sources of food 
and nesting areas, wearing insect repellent, and wearing gloves when 
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handling dead animals must be included on any plague informational 
program (CDC, 2003c). L 
The manufacturing of a formaldehyde-killed vaccine stopped in 
: 
1999 and future plans are unclear. "Research is ongoing in the pursuit of t 
a vaccine that protects against primary pneumonic plague" (lngelsby, 
2000, p. 2283). L 
Treatment 
Streptomycin administered either intramuscularly or orally is the 
antibiotic of choice for plague. The Federal Drug Administration has also 
authorized the use of tetracycline and doxycycline but recent strains of Y. 
Pestis may be resistant to doxycycline. The key to the success of 
antimicrobial therapy is the speed of delivery verses symptom onset. "The 
fatality rate of patients with pneumonic plague when treatment is delayed 
more than 24 hours after symptom onset is extremely high" (lngelsby, 
2000, p. 2285). 
In the event of a biological attack or if there is a community 
experiencing a plague outbreak, it is recommended that anyone 
"developing a temperature of 38.5°C or higher or new cough should 
promptly begin parenteral antibiotic treatment" (lngelsby, 2000, p. 2285). 
Botulism 
History 
Botulism is different from the other biological agents because 
Clostridium botulinum is not the harmful agent; it is the toxin that is 
Bioterrorism 
produced after the introduction of the bacteria that causes the disease 
called Botulism. Clostridium botulinum is a "sporeforming, obligate 
anaerobe whose natural habitat is soil. .. consists of 4 genetically diverse 
groups that would not otherwise be designated as a single species except 
for their common characteristic of producing botulinum toxin" (Arnon, 
2001, p. 1 060). When the Clostridium botulinum is introduced into the 
human cells, a toxin is formed. Botulinum toxin, one of the most 
poisonous substances on earth, is a neurotoxin that in humans prohibits 
the release of acetylcholine (English, 1999). 
In 2001 botulinum toxin became the first biological toxin to be used 
in the treatment of medical conditions such as cervical torticollis, 
strabismus, and blepharospasm (Arnon, 2001). This is an amazing 
dichotomy compared to the devastation that a small amount of this toxin 
can inflict when used as a biological weapon. According to Arnon (2001), 
"a single gram of crystalline toxin, evehly dispersed and inhaled, would kill 
more than 1 million people" (p. 1061 ). Between 1990 and 1995 it is 
believed that the Aum Shinrikyo cult attempted to release aerosolized 
botulism but due to technical difficulties, their attempts were unsuccessful. 
Foodborne botulism has been used as a weapon for over 60 years, the 
first time by the Japanese when they fed prisoners in Manchuria cultures 
of C. botulinum. Due to the fear of potential exposure during World War II, 
the Allied troops were given the toxoid vaccine before invading Normandy 
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on D-Day (Amon, 2001). Both inhalation and ingestion are routes of entry 
that may be used as a biological weapon. 
Mode of Transmission/Communicability 
There are three forms of naturally occurring botulism: foodborne, 
wound, and intestinal, and one type of manmade: inhalational. Neither 
wound nor intestinal botulism would be caused by a biological attack. ~-j 
Naturally occurring outbreaks of botulism are very rare in the United 
States and are usually caused by home canned foods that are not heated 
thoroughly. All types of foods have been associated with botulism. Food 
L [ 
items such as beans, peppers, carrots, and corn are the most common 
sources of botulism outbreaks. Each state in the U.S. has had outbreaks 
of botulism with an average of 24 cases occurring annually (Arnon, 2001). I { 
' 
The inhalational form of botulism has been demonstrated 
experimentally in primates, has been attempted by terrorists, and has 
occurred accidentally in West Germany when veterinary workers were l f 
disposing of fur coated with botulinum toxin. Because the port of entry of 
botulism is not as important as the fact that a toxin is formed, it is believed 
that both the naturally occurring and inhalational forms will have the same 
clinical symptoms. 
In the United States deaths associated with botulism have 
decreased "25% during 1950-1959 to 6% during 1990-1996" (Arnon, 
2001, p. 1059). 
Bioterrorism 
Signs & Symptoms 
English (1999) affirmed that patients with botulism will experience 
these signs and symptoms 
• responsive patient with absence of fever; 
• symmetric cranial neuropathies (drooping eyelids, weakened jaw 
clench, difficulty swallowing or speaking); 
• blurred vision and diplopia due to extra-ocular muscle palsies; 
• symmetric descending weakness in a proximal to distal pattern 
(paralysis of arms first, followed by respiratory muscles, then legs); 
• respiratory dysfunction from respiratory muscle paralysis or upper 
airway obstruction due to weakened glottis; and 
• no sensory deficits. 
Because there is paralysis of the respiratory muscles, mechanical 
ventilation must be provided to prevent patients from dying. 
These symptoms depend on the rate and the absorption of the 
toxin. They begin to appear 12 to 72 hours after the food is ingested but 
can present even after 72 hours. It is believed that inhalational botulism 
would follow a similar timeline as shown in the three cases that occurred 
in West Germany. All three victims developed symptoms within 72 hours. 
Infection and Exposure Control 
Botulinum toxin is generally acquired through undercooked food so 
the need for proper food handling and preparation techniques will prevent 
infection. The toxin can be eliminated from foods by elevating the internal 
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temperature of 85°C for at least five minutes during cooking. Botulism is 
not transferred person-to-person so only universal precautions are 
warranted. 
Prevention or Prophylaxis 
The Department of Defense has developed a petavalent vaccine 
that has been shown to produce detectable antitoxin levels 1-year post 
vaccination.· Due to its scarcity and the elimination of the potential 
medicinal benefits, mass immunization is not recommended for the public 
or health care workers (English, 1999). It has been available through the 
CDC for laboratory workers and military personnel for over 30 years. 
Post-exposure use of the vaccine is not appropriate because 
immunity takes several months to develop. 
Treatment 
Therapy for botulism consists of two techniques: passive 
immunization with equine antitoxin and supportive care. The antitoxin is 
used to prevent future nerve damage so it must be started as soon as 
botulism is suspected. The antitoxin can not reverse existent paralysis. 
There are side effects associated with the use of the toxin. Anaphylaxis 
occurs in 2% of patients and approximately 9% of the population 
experience "urticaria, serum sickness or other reactions suggestive of 
hypersensitivity" (Arnon, 2001, p. 1 062). 
Supportive therapy consists of parenteral nutrition, mechanical 
ventilation, and prevention of secondary infections. Depending on the 
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extent of the toxin proliferation, this therapy may need to be in place for an 
extended period of time. 
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CHAPTER3 
ROLE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
NURSE IN BIOLOGICAL THREAT PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 
All of America is at risk for terrorism but industries may be at 
greater risk due to their high visibility in the international community, their 
representation of the "capitalistic" system, and the fact that so many 
people can be housed in one facility at one time. These three factors 
make it imperative that industry prepare for a terrorist attack. As seen on 
9/11 , the targets were not only the specific businesses that represented 
America but also the ability to harm the most people and property at one 
time. When many people gather together, either at work or in recreation, 
they must be aware that terrorists may view this as an opportunity to inflict 
harm. There is also an economic reason to be prepared. If an attack 
were to happen, businesses must recover quickly to help both their 
employees and the economy as a whole. Industries must be prepared by 
having an emergency management plan that includes direction and 
control, communications, life safety, property protection, community 
outreach, recovery, restoration, and administration/logistics. 
How does the occupational and environmental health nurse 
(OEHN) prepare and react to terrorism? Terrorism is different than any 
other occupational threat because it causes both economic and physical 
harm. While the OEHN needs to prepare for disasters at his/her facility, 
many can not imagine the trauma that would occur if a planned, 
39 
i 
L. 
t 
L 
t 
r--
1 
L 
L 
f 
l 
L 
I 
r 
t 
' l 
; 
~-
Bioterrorism 40 F 
coordinated terrorist attack happened. According to Cangemi (2002), 
"These emergencies can involve mass destruction of company property, 
widespread injury and death, unsafe conditions for caregivers, and the 
emotional stress brought forth by the intentional devastation" (p. 1) . 
. Emergency management is defined as "the process of preparing 
~--
for, mitigating, responding to and recovering from an emergency" (FEMA, 
2002, p. 2). The American Association of Occupational Health Nurses 
(AAOHN) recently published a position statement that defines the OEHN's 
role in all-hazard preparedness. "The OEHN should be prepared to 
perform multiple levels of response, both in the planning process and in 
the emergency event itself' (AAOHN, 2003, ~ 2). The planning process, 
including education and emergency response, will be discussed with a 
focus on the preparedness needed for a biological terrorist attack. 
Planning Process 
Disaster planning is a complicated and intense process that 
involves developing strong coalitions both internal and external to 
occupational health. Many integral groups need to be consulted during 
the planning process to ensure a comprehensive plan. Groups to include 
are management, accounting, industrial hygiene, safety/risk management, 
security, union and employee representatives, local EMS, and local public 
health authorities (AAOHN, 2001a). 
The OEHN must systematically evaluate his/her unique role in the 
planning process. The administrative roles of planning, organizing, 
Bioterrorism 
directing, coordinating, and controlling (Randolph, 1994) can guide this 
planning process. 
The first step is planning. Planning is done to give participants the 
knowledge they need before an emergency event occurs. An emergency 
plan should include an emergency response procedure such as escape 
routes, how to report an emergency, and contact names. It should also 
include support documentation including call lists, resource lists, and 
building maps. During the planning cycle the OEHN should also identify 
how the response will be coordinated with community personnel, the 
specific business recovery priorities, and a training plan. Due to the 
complex nature of the occupational health (OH) department recovery 
process, the OH emergency plan must be a unique yet integrated part of 
the entire company emergency management plan. After the events of 
9/11 and the relative "newness" of the terrorist threat in America, every 
OH department should be prepared for a terrorist attack. 
Organizing must always be done before the emergency occurs. 
Frequent training must be provided to key people to ensure enough 
knowledgeable staff are available should an event occur. By establishing 
clear roles, OH staff can be used to the best of their abilities during an 
emergency. Budgeting is also a part of organizing and can not be 
overlooked. Emergency equipment must be purchased ahead of time so it 
is available. Isolated areas must be available to house employees should 
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they not be allowed to leave the facility or if they need to be air-lifted to a i 
specialized hospital. L 
Directing is "the face-to-face interaction between managers and 
subordinates in accomplishing the goals of the organization" (Rogers, 
1994, .p. 54). This is critical to keeping threat preparation a priority of the 
organization. While the threat of terrorism is real, it is not as tangible as 
the daily needs of injury management, cost containment, and staff attrition. 
Directing uses the OEHN's skills in communication and persuasion to 
ensure the goal of being prepared is met. 
Coordinating occurs in determining whether all the necessary 
emergency preparedness steps are in place. Emergency drills for 
biological threats can be conducted to evaluate if the planning, organizing,. 
and directing were done adequately. Drills must be performed at least 
annually as staff changes commonly occur. Another example of 
coordinating is a third party audit of the emergency plan. This can shed 
light on areas where the plan was inadequate or missed critical 
information. 
Controlling, the final function of the administrative role, determines 
if the goal of being prepared for a bioterrorist attack was achieved. I 
Annual evaluation and review must be performed and changes made to 
improve any deficiencies. 
The administrator role is complicated and tests the OEHN's 
strategic and tactical skills. In emergency preparedness the role of the 
Bioterrorism 
OEHN can not be underestimated. By using all five of the administrative 
functions, the OEHN becomes an integral part of the company's 
emergency preparedness plan. 
With the unique knowledge of both health and business, the OEHN 
easily takes on the role of educator in a bioterrorism situation. The OEHN 
has at least three audiences to address: management, environmental 
health and safety (EHS) professionals, and employees. Because each 
has unique needs and focus areas, the OEHN considers these when 
developing an educational plan about bioterrorism. 
Management will need to be educated as to the potential economic 
and business impact of a bioterrorist attack, their role in the event of an 
attack, and the preparedness plan of the OH department. The OEHN 
must have excellent communication skills to discuss management's 
financial and ethical responsibilities in disaster planning. This can be a 
very emotionally charged issue when management must decide between 
the reality of needing a new piece of equipment and a request for 
additional emergency equipment that they may never need. The OEHN 
must understand this delicate balance when educating management on 
preparedness for biological threats. 
Another large group that the OEHN will need to educate is EHS 
professionals. These include other OEHNs and co-workers such as safety 
engineers, industrial hygienists, environmental engineers, and emergency 
response personnel. This training should focus on an overview of the 
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biological agents, their roles in the event of a biological attack, and proper 
protection of themselves and others should an event occur. OEHNs who 
are not bioterrorism experts but need to respond should receive more in-
depth training of the disease process including transmission, 
communicability, signs and symptoms, and treatment of biological agents. 
Education of employees should be tailored to meet their needs. A 
tremendous amount of information and misinformation is available to 
employees. This can be.seen in. the recent duct tape boom that occurred 
when someone of authority made the erroneous statement that people 
can be protected against biological agents if they duct tape all the vents. 
Employees should know the basics signs and symptoms of diseases, 
common treatment modalities, and outcomes. The education must also 
include information of emergency contacts, procedures, and plans. 
Emergency Response 
Generally people think of the OEHN as a first responder for any 
event in the worksite. In a bioterrorist attack the term first responder has 
two meanings: the first responder after a known event and the first 
responder after an unknown event. 
As a first responder after a known event, the OEHN's primary 
function is to limit exposure. Because all of the biological agents have 
incubation periods ranging from 12 hours to 14 days, the OEHN will not 
immediately see large numbers of causalities or even a large number of ill 
people. 
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Until the biological agent used in the attack is known, great care 
must be taken to ensure that no one else is exposed. Isolation of the 
infecting host, such as an envelope with an unknown white substance 
inside or the package containing an aerosolized agent being dispersed, 
should be left to the proper authorities. This is when the term "Don't 
become the next victim" is critical for the OEHN to practice. Even though 
there is ~ot an obvious gas leak, fire, or casualty event, the OEHN should 
not be placed in a hazardous situation and potentially exposed to deadly 
biological agents. 
The OEHN must assess workers entering the hazardous area. If 
the industry has equipped its own Emergency Response Team (ERT) the 
OEHN must ensure that they, as well as those responders who may enter 
the facility, are provided with proper personal protective equipment. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued interim 
recommendations for the selection of both protective equipment and 
respirators used against biological agents (CDC, 2003e). The 
recommendations are: 
1. Responders should use a NIOSH-approved, pressure-demand 
SCBA in conjunction with a Level A protective suit when responding 
to a suspected biological incident where any of the following 
information is unknown or the event is uncontrolled 
• the type(s) of airborne agent(s); 
• the dissemination method; or 
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• if dissemination via an aerosol-generating device is still 
occurring or it has stopped but there is no information on the ~-
duration of dissemination, or what the exposure 
concentration might be. 
2. Responders may use a Level B protective suit with an exposed or ' I 
enclosed NIOSH-approved pressure demand SCBA ifthe situation r 
can be defined in which 
• the suspected biological aerosol is no longer being 
generated; or 
• other conditions may present a splash hazard. 
3. Responders may use a full face respirator with a P1 00 filter or 
powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) with high efficiency I ' 
particulate air (HEPA) filters when it can be determined that 
• an aerosol-generating device was not used to create high 1 
l 
airborne concentration; or 
• dissemination was by a letter or package that can be easily 
~ 
I 
bagged. 
Along with the isolation of the substance, the OEH N must also 
consider whether isolation is necessary for people who have been 
exposed. Universal or standard precautions are the minimum 
requirements that must be applied to all victims. If the agent is unknown 
the strictest isolation precautions must be observed to ensure there is no 
disease transmission, including use of gloves, respirators, masks, eye 
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protection, shoe covers, and face shields. Table 3.1 outlines precautions 
needed based on the biological agent. 
The more likely scenario is the OEHN functioning as the first 
responder in an unknown attack. The OEHN may be the first to see the 
onset of a biological disease process. Important epidemiologic principles 
can be applied to this situation, including 
1. a rapidly increasing disease incident (e.g., within hours or days) in 
a normally health population; 
2. an epidemic curve that rises and falls during a short period of time; 
3. an unusual increase in the number of people seeking care 
especially with fever, respiratory, or gastrointestinal complaints; 
4. an endemic disease rapidly emerging at an uncharacteristic time or 
in an unusual pattern; 
5. lower attack rates among people who had been indoors, especially 
those areas with filtered air or closed ventilation systems, 
compared with people who had been outdoors; 
6. clusters of patients arriving from a single locale; 
7. large number of rapidly fatal cases; and/or 
8. any patient presenting with a disease that is relatively uncommon 
and has bioterrorism potential (e.g., pulmonary anthrax, tularemia, 
or plague) (English, 1999). 
Bioterrorism 
Table 3.1 
Precautions for Victims Exposed to Biological Agents 
Patients can Airborne Routine use 
be placed transmission of gloves for 
together does not contact with 
occur even intact and 
with non-intact 
inhalational skin 
anthrax 
Isolation of Droplet Universal -Post-mortem 
patients to precaution droplet 
private rooms as disease precautions 
or with can be -Perform 
patients with spread via surface de-
similar sneezing, contamination 
symptoms coughing etc with approved 
sporicidal/ 
germicidal 
-Monitored Airborne Gloves and -Airborne and 
negative air precautions gown contact 
pressure in require the precautions 
relationship to use of post-mortem 
outside room respiratory -Single use 
areas protection equipment 
-6-12 air that includes whenever 
exchanges per a NIOSH possible 
hour N95 rated 
-Appropriate particulate 
discharge of respirator 
air to outdoors 
or filtration if it 
is to return 
-Door must 
remain closed 
-Patients with 
smallpox can 
be placed 
Source: English (1999) 
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The OEHN must use both knowledge of the disease processes of 
bioterrorism agents and his/her astute assessment skills. If the OEHN 
suspects the symptoms or patterns that are being seen might be related to 
a biological agent, he/she must contact either the local hospital or nearest 
state health department so a complete evaluation can begin. 
Along with clinical skills of physical symptom diagnosis, the OEHN 
must also look after the employees' emotional and psychological needs. 
If an event has occurred at the facility, the OEHN must also treat 
employees who have not been exposed to the biological agent but have 
been exposed to terrorism. Post-traumatic counseling is needed 
immediately to help employees cope with seeing their co-workers, friends, 
and family harmed. On-going psychological counseling may also be 
needed. Even if an event were to occur away from the work location, 
employees may experience the common responses to trauma. These can 
include physical and emotional reactions, productivity effects, and delayed 
reactions. Table 3.2 details the common responses to trauma. 
Follow-up and patient advocacy are also roles of the OEHN in this 
setting. Co-workers may be very confused and upset when their fellow 
employees are placed in isolation after a potential smallpox exposure but 
the OEHN can assist by educating and preparing them for the normal 
routine associated with these disease processes. Case management, one 
of the cornerstones of OEHN clinical practice, can be applied to assist the 
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Table 3.2 
Common Responses to Trauma 
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Hyperactivity Flashbacks Inability to Increased 
and nervous concentrate depression or 
energy flashbacks 
Fatigue Jumpiness Increased errors Decreased sex 
Appetite 
changes 
Muscle tremors 
Headaches 
Heart 
palpitations/ 
increased 
respiration 
Chest pain 
Dizziness 
Excessive 
sweating 
Visual 
disturbances 
Grinding teeth 
Irritability 
Anger 
Anxiety or 
helplessness 
Fear/panic 
Guilt 
Withdrawal 
Changes in 
aggressiveness 
Increased 
consumption of 
alcohol or drugs 
Source: AAOHN (2001b) 
or omissions drive 
Lapses in Excessive or too 
memory little sleep 
Absenteeism Appetite change 
Tendency to Loss of 
overwork emotional 
Reduced 
alertness 
Reduced 
awareness of job 
risks 
Difficulty making 
decisions and 
problem solving 
control 
Loss of interest 
in family or 
previously 
enjoyed 
activities 
Reevaluation of 
career or life 
Anger/grief/ 
vulnerability 
Survivor guilt 
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employee to manage the disease through the healthcare system maze. If 
the ipjury ,happened ~t work and is an actbf bi6'terr6rism, is it covered 
. ' -- . ~ .. 
under Workers' Compensation or private health insurance? Will 
communicable disease treatment be provided at a county or private 
hospital? All of these questions will need to be answered by the OEHN 
before an event occurs. 
Whether the OEHN is viewed as an emergency responder, 
educator, or administer, he/she must be knowledgeable of biological 
threats and be able to communicate these issues efficiently and effectively 
so that companies can be prepared in these uncertain times. 
Bioterrorism 
CHAPTER4 
BIOLOGICAL THREAT ASSESSMENT TOOL 
Development 
While there are many challenges in emergency preparedness, a 
key challenge was to assess a large semiconductor company's 
occupational health departments' ability to respond to a biological 
emergency. A Systems Approach, as described by Rogers (1994), was 
used as it provided an organized and comprehensive approach. A series 
of questions were developed to assess the three major components of 
environmental influences, system inputs, and system throughputs and 
their sub-components as illustrated in Table 4.1. 
The questions were designed to ask information specific to 
biological threat preparedness. The OEHNs in charge of the department at 
the three test sites were asked 51 questions. The goal of the tool was to 
assess the clinics' preparedness. The tool focused on the specific clinics' 
improvement plan and was not used as a grading scale for which clinic 
was the "best." Due to the global nature of the semiconductor company, it 
would be counterproductive to compare clinics across the world as each 
government and local municipality may have different emergency 
preparedness requirements. The Microsoft Excel worksheet designed to 
capture both the questions and answers is located in Appendices A-C. 
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Table4.1 
Systems Approach 
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The participants were asked to rank each answer on a scale of one 
to five, with one being "Strongly Disagree", three being "Neutral" and five 
being "Strongly Agree". The individual question totals were compiled and 
then compared to a 951h, 75th, and 50th percentile. This was done to better 
understand where the site could improve. A score within 10 points of the 
951h,percentile within a sub-category was established as a benchmark of 
success. An example is a question in technology which states, "My 
community has an emergency broadcasting system." This may be scored 
as a "1" (strongly disagree), but because the community has another 
method to communicate the entire section may still score within the 75th_ 
95th percentile. 
Application and Gap Analysis 
Due to the global nature of this company, a site from each of the 
three major regions (Asia, Europe, and the Americas) was selected to pilot 
the tool. It was felt that this would give more diverse results. The sites in 
Penang, Ireland, and Massachusetts volunteered to be the three test sites. 
The tool developer conducted interviews with each site nurse manager to 
collect the data. Face to face interviews were conducted in both Penang 
and Ireland, and a telephone interview was conducted to collect the data 
from Massachusetts. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. The 
tool was designed to provide real time results so the nurse manager 
received the results at the end of the interview. A preliminary gap analysis 
was completed during the last 30 minutes of the interview. The nurse 
Bioterrorism 
manager reviewed the results with the site occupational health team and 
developed a comprehensive list of improvement goals. A summary of 
each site will be reviewed. 
Penang 
The Penang site is located in Malaysia and is the largest assembly 
and test facility for this semiconductor manufacturer. The employee base 
is close to 6,000, with an occupational and environmental health nursing 
staff of seven. Nurses are available 24 hours a day, seven days a week 
and provide both occupational injury management and primary care 
nursing. 
A key strength of the Penang team is their ability to manage 
programs and negotiate the needs of the OH department. During the 
interview it also became clear that Penang's deficits were primarily in the 
"environmental influences" section. The staff decided to focus on the 
specific areas, as noted by the red colored results, which have the lowest 
total score. Table 4.2 details the Penang site results. 
The Penang gap analysis or areas for improvement included: 
1. Develop a strategy within the OH department to understand how 
the community will communicate bioterrorist activities and put in 
place a process to stay "connected" to this system at all times. 
2. Understand what the government is doing to prevent bioterrorism 
and how it impacts the occupational health department. 
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Table 4.2 
Penang Site Assessment Results 
Areas Score Total 95% 75% 50% 
Possible 
Environmental influences 43 85.00 80.75 63.75 42.50 
Technology 9 20.00 19.00 15.00 10.00 
Population/health trends 17 25.00 23.75 18.75 12.50 
Economics 8 15.00 14.25 11.25 7.50 
Legislation/ 9 25.00 23.75 18.75 12.50 
politics/regulatory 
Inputs 74 115.00 109.25 86.25 57.50 
Corporate culture 13 15.00 14.25 11.25 7.50 
Workforce 16 30.00 28.50 22.50 15.00 
Work/process and related 7 10.00 9.50 7.50 5.00 
hazards 
Human/operational 28 45.00 42.75 33.75 22.50 
resources 
Informational resources 7 10.00 9.50 7.50 50.00 
Organizational/occupational 3 5.00 4.75 3.75 5.00 
health unit goals 
Throughputs 38 55.00 52.25 41.25 27.50 
Clinical/analytical skills, 21 35.00 33.25 26.25 17.50 
knowledge, experience 
Collaborative decision 5 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
making skills and 
processes 
Interpersonal/negotiation 5 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
skills 
Program 5 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
management/objectives 
Documentation 2 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
Bioterrorism 
3. Conduct an assessment of the workforce to understand how they 
may be impacted by a bioterrorist attack. 
4. Obtain additional information/training on the OEHN's role and 
bioterrorism agents. 
5. Improve the documentation of the bioterrorism preparedness plan. 
Ireland 
The Ireland site, located in the rural town of Lexilip northeast of 
Dublin, used the tool next. There were two manufacturing facilities on the 
site and a third facility in the final stages of construction. There are six 
OEHN's on staff and two additional support personnel. The clinic is open 
24 hours a day for the 7,500 employees who work there. 
During the interview the Ireland nurse manager stated, 'We have 
been dealing with internal terrorism from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
for many, many years." While this is true, it became clear, while 
answering the questions, that there was a lot more work that needed to be 
done. Table 4.3 details the Ireland results with the lowest results in red. 
Although the gaps were not as severe as the Penang site, there were very 
similar. 
The Ireland gap analysis or areas for improvement found after 
application of the tool included: 
1. Understand what the government is doing to prevent bioterrorism 
and how it impacts the OH department. 
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Table 4.3 
Ireland Site Assessment Results 
Areas Score Total 95% 75% 50% 
Possible 
Environmental influences 52 85.00 80.75 63.75 42.50 
Technology 12 20.00 19.00 15.00 10.00 
Population/health trends 16 25.00 23.75 18.75 12.50 
Economics 14 15.00 14.25 11.25 7.50 
Legislation/ 10 25.00 23.75 18.75 12.50 
politics/regulatory 
Inputs 86 115.00 109.25 86.25 57.50 
Corporate culture 14 15.00 14.25 11.25 7.50 
Workforce 20 30.00 28.50 22.50 15.00 
Work/process and related 7 10.00 9.50 7.50 5.00 
hazards 
Human/operational 34 45.00 42.75 33.75 22.50 
resources 
Informational resources 7 10.00 9.50 7.50 50.00 
Organizational/occupational 4 5.00 4.75 3.75 5.00 
health unit goals 
Throughputs 37 55.00 52.25 41.25 27.50 
Clinical/analytical skills, 20 35.00 33.25 26.25 17.50 
knowledge, experience 
Collaborative decision 5 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
making skills and 
processes 
Interpersonal/negotiation 5 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
skills 
Program 5 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
management/objectives 
Documentation 2 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
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2. Conduct an assessment of the workforce to understand how they 
may be impacted by a bioterrorist attack. 
3. Obtain additional information/training on the OEHN's role and 
bioterrorism agents. 
4. Improve the documentation of the bioterrorism preparedness plan. 
Massachusetts 
The final site to use the tool was Massachusetts. Being the only 
U.S. based site, the OH managementin Hudson entered the process with 
a feeling of "preparedness" but left knowing that they still had many areas 
to improve. This interview was the only one done on the phone due to 
travel restrictions. 
The Massachusetts site is located in the central part of the state. 
One manufacturing plant is located at this site with an employee base of 
less than 1 ,000 people. The nursing staff is small with three OEHNs. The 
site utilized a large number of contract ortemporary nurses to manage 
their night shift coverage. Table 4.4 outlines their scores with the low 
scores highlighted in red. 
The Massachusetts gap analysis or areas for improvement found 
after application of the tool included: 
1. Conduct an assessment of the workforce to understand how they 
may be impacted by a bioterrorist attack. 
2. Obtain additional information/training on the OEHN's role and the 
agents of bioterrorism. 
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Table 4.4 
Massachusetts Site Assessment Results 
Areas Score Total 95% 75% 50% 
Possible 
Environmental influences 68 85.00 80.75 63.75 42.50 
Technology 17 20.00 19.00 15.00 10.00 
Population/health trends 20 25.00 23.75 18.75 12.50 
Economics 10 15.00 14.25 11.25 7.50 
Legislation/ 21 25.00 23.75 18.75 12.50 
politics/regulatory .· 
Inputs 94 115.00 109.25 86.25 57.50 
Corporate culture 15 15.00 14.25 11.25 7.50 
Workforce 20 30.00 28.50 22.50 15.00 
Work/process and related 7 10.00 9.50 7.50 5.00 
hazards 
Human/operational 39 45.00 42.75 33.75 22.50 
resources 
Informational resources 8 10.00 9.50 7.50 50.00 
Organizational/occupational 5 5.00 4.75 3.75 5.00 
health unit goals 
Throughputs 36 55.00 52.25 41.25 27.50 
Clinical/analytical skills, 21 35.00 33.25 26.25 17.50 
knowledge, experience 
Collaborative decision 4 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
making skills and 
processes 
Interpersonal/negotiation 5 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
skills 
Program 4 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
management/objectives 
Documentation 2 5.00 4.75 3.75 2.50 
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3. Improve the documentation of the bioterrorism preparedness plan. 
Findings and Evaluation 
The three sites had similar issues after completing the tool. Since 
Penang was the first to use the tool, the OH 'Staff developed improvement 
goals that both Ireland and Massachusetts used to determine their OH 
departments' improvement plans. The glaring global finding was the OH 
departments' lack of knowledge about the nurse's role in biological threat 
preparedness and the disease processes associated with biological 
terrorism. Massachusetts, the only U.S. site, was very surprised not to 
have higher scores and set goals to reach the 95 percentile by the end of 
2003, 
The OEHN leaders within the company met and reviewed the results 
from the three pilot sites. The team decided that instead of having all 25 
sites use the tool that they would set the following global occupational 
health goals for 2003 and 2004 
• educate all OEHNs about their role in biological threat 
preparedness; 
• train all OEHNs in the disease processes of the top biological 
threats as assigned by the Centers for Disease Control; and 
• document a biological threat preparedness plan for each site. 
A training session was completed using the biological threat profiles 
described earlier. The initial training focused on the biological agents. 
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Subsequent training will focus on chemical, nuclear, and other weapons of 
mass destruction. 
The three test sites will complete the biological threat assessment 
tool again in 2004 to see if their total scores improved particularly in areas 
affected by education. 
Even though it is difficult to prepare for a terrorist attack, there are 
actions that an OH department can take to minimize the impact of these 
events on themselves, their workforce, and their community. After using 
the tool, the OH departments developed a plan to move forward with 
preparedness, thus taking the first steps to being prepared for a 
bioterrorist attack. 
Bioterrorism 
CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION 
Knowledge and preparedness are the only defense against 
terrorism of any type. Whether that knowledge comes from having an 
emergency preparedness plan or employee education, the OEHN must 
play an active role to ensure a safe and healthful working environment. 
The U.S. government has provided direction on what disease agents may 
be used in a biological attack. The OEHN must now educate him/herself 
not only on the physical signs and symptoms of disease but also the 
treatment expectations associated with each disease process. The role of 
the OEHN is varied and complex and includes the administrative roles of 
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling. Preparation 
can begin through a systematic assessment of the current situation and 
development of a plan that will close the gaps found in the analysis. The 
OEHN has the expertise to see where all the pieces of the puzzle fit 
together and provide a safe environment for his/her employees and 
community. 
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APPENDIX. A 
Sample Assessment Tool 
Scoring Scale 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Slightly 
Disagree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Slightly 
Agree 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Environmental Influences 
Technology 
My community has an emergency broadcasting 
system 
My community has the ability to communicate to 
my company should bioterrorism occur 
My community does not house or produce 
biological agents 
The WWW is accessible within my community 
Population/ 
Health 
Trends 
My community does not have a group of people 
that may be more susceptible to biological agents 
i.e. those with lower immune systems, the young 
or the elderly 
My community does not have a subgroup that 
supports the use of biological agents as an act of 
terrorism 
My community does not have a subgroup that 
has been called up to active duty in the armed 
forces 
My community does not have a subgroup of 
spouses/significant others of those called up in 
the armed forces 
Economics 
My community has a positive economy (stable 
unemployment rates, low inflation etc) 
My community would be negatively affected if a 
biological event were to happen 
My community would be positively affected if a 
biological event were to happen 
Score 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Assessment Tool (cont) 
Environmental Influences 
Legislation/ Score 
Politics/ 
Regulatory 
My federal government has a policy in place to 0 
fight bioterrorism t-; 
My state/local government has a policy in place to 0 
fight bioterrorism 
My community has an Emergency Operations 0 L 
Center structure l 
My local emergency preparedness office has a 0 
post-biological attack plan 
My Nursing/Occupational Health Association has 0 
information on what to do should a biological 
attack occur 
! 
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APPENDIX B 
Sample Assessment Tool 
Scoring Scale 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Inputs 
Corporate 
Culture 
Workforce 
Slightly 
Disagree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Slightly 
Agree 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
The company supports biological threat 
preparedness 
The company supports employees and their 
families in regards to biological threat 
preparedness 
The workforce is concerned about the threat 
of biological attack 
The workforce does not have a group of 
people that are more susceptible to biological 
agents i.e. those with lower immune systems, 
the young, or elderly 
The workforce does not have a subgroup that 
may support the use of bioterroism against the 
workforce 
The workforce does not have a subgroup of 
spouses/significant others of those called up 
in the armed forces 
The workforce has a "history" with the control 
of communicable diseases. 
Wori</Processes 
and Related 
Hazards 
There are no work hazards where employee's 
may be exposed to biological agents 
Employee's do not travel to areas that may be 
impacted by biological agents 
Score 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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APPENDIXB t-
Sample Assessment Tool (cont.) 
Inputs 
Human/ Score 
Operational 
Resources 
The companies resources include 0 
Occupational Physician 0 
Industrial Hygienist 0 
Toxicologist 0 
Emergency Preparedness Coordinator with 0 
knowledge of biological threats 
Psychologists/post disaster counseling/EAP 0 
Relationship with community physicians 0 
The community provides me with the 0 
resources (money/people) to prepare for 
biological threats 
The OHN department has adequate supplies, 0 
space, and equipment should a biological 
attack occur 
Informational 
Resources 
The OH department has the information it 0 
needs to deal with biological agents I 
The OH department has access to the Internet 0 
Organizational/ 
t 
Occupational 
Health Units 
Goals 
' 
Biological threat preparedness is one of the 0 
OH department goals 
Bioterrorism 
APPENDIXC 
Sample Assessment Tool 
Scoring Scale 
strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Slightly 
Disagree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Slightly 
Agree 
4 
strongly 
Agree 
5 
Throughputs 
Clinical/Analytical 
Skills, 
Knowledge, 
Experience 
The OEHN staff knowledgeable of the 
federal/local policies to fight bioterrorism 
The OEHN staff knowledgeable of the 
history, mode of transmission, 
communicability, signs & symptoms, 
response protocol, infection and exposure 
control, prevention or prophylaxis, and 
treatment of Class A biological threats 
Anthrax 
Botulism 
Plague 
Smallpox 
Tularemia 
Collaborative 
Decision Making 
Skills and 
Processes 
The OEHN staff is comfortable working on 
teams 
Interpersonal/ 
Negotiation Skills 
The OEHN staff is excellent at project 
management 
Documentation 
There is a documented OEHN plan should 
an act of bioterrorism occur 
Score 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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APPENDIXD 
Assessment Totals and Percentages 
Areas Score Total 95% 
Possible 
Environmental influences 85.00 80.75 
Technology 20.00 19.00 
Population/health trends 25.00 23.75 
Economics 15.00 14.25 
Legislation/ 25.00 23.75 
politics/regulatory 
Inputs 115.00 109.25 
Corporate culture 15.00 14.25 
Workforce 30.00 28.50 
Work/process and related 10.00 9.50 
hazards 
Human/operational 45.00 42.75 
resources 
Informational resources 10.00 9.50 
Organizational/occupational . 5.00 4.75 
health unit goals 
· Throughputs 55.00 52.25 
Clinical/analytical skills, 35.00 33.25 
knowledge, experience 
Collaborative decision 5.00 4.75 
making skills and 
processes 
Interpersonal/negotiation 5.00 4.75 
skills 
Program 5.00 4.75 
management/objectives 
Documentation 5.00 4.75 
Bioterrorism 
75% 50% 
63.75 42.50 
15.00 10.00 
18.75 12.50 
11.25 7.50 
18.75 12.50 
86.25 57.50 
11.25 7.50 
22.50 15.00 
7.50 5.00 
33.75 22.50 
7.50 50.00 
3.75 5.00 
41.25 27.50 
26.25 17.50 
3.75 2.50 
3.75 2.50 
3.75 2.50 
3.75 2.50 
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